Introduction
Theoretical models of joint liability have shown that it improves repayment performance by mitigating asymmetric information problems. Joint liability leads to better contract enforcement by creating more effective mechanisms of screening and monitoring, and by harnessing social ties among group members.
i Numerous empirical studies have also found support for these theoretical models.
ii One of striking aspect of much of the theoretical work is that every member of the group is assumed to be identical. Consequently, they are all equally involved in screening, monitoring and enforcement, and use their social ties to the same extent to ensure repayment. However in practice this need not be true. In this paper we empirically investigate whether these activities have unequal consequences for the group's repayment performance based on who undertakes them. In particular, we examine if group leader related variables affect repayment performance differently from the rest of the group members, and indeed, we find that leaders have a different affect on repayment than other group members.
Two factors prompted us to undertake this investigation. First, is the nature of the role played by the group leaders in such lending schemes and second, is the fact financial considerations can affect the behavior of group members. Simply put, the fact that a group leader carries out additional tasks can potentially provide some informational advantage. Moreover, these additional tasks however simple and insignificant may impose additional pressure on conscientious group leaders to perform better. We can categorize all these aspects of a leader's behavior in a systematic manner into the following two effects: (i) the "intermediary" affect which argues that the leaders have an information advantage relative to others and therefore may be able to better affect repayment. Additionally, being intermediaries, leaders do all the reporting for the group and therefore may be putting in more effort to induce better repayment, iii and, (ii) the increased joint liability effect which as the name suggests arises from the fact that the higher loan amount induces greater effort from the leader.
The data used in the empirical analysis was collected by surveying borrowing groups in cooperation with the Microfund for Women (MFW), a group lending institution in Jordan. Repayment data for these groups was obtained from the MFW itself. After combining data from both these sources, we find that on average leaders do not differ from other group members in most individual characteristics. The two variables in which they differ are education levels and religious practice: on average leaders are more educated and are more religious than the average group member. To examine whether screening and monitoring activities, social ties, and the joint liability payment of the leader affect repayment performance differently from that of the other group members,
we use a Negative Binomial model. We find that activities of the leaders have a significant effect on repayment performance, though this is not always true for the other group members.
The first paper to point out the importance of the quality of the leader for the performance of a group is Paxton, Graham and Thraen (2000) . However, they do not investigate this question in any detail. To the best of our knowledge the only paper in the literature to directly address this question is Hermes, Lensink, and Mehrteab (2006).
These authors use survey data from 102 borrowing groups from Eritrea to distinguish between the effects of monitoring and social ties of the group leader and other group members, on the repayment performance of the group. Their data comes from two different group lending programs that operate both in urban and rural areas. For every group the survey questions were put to the group leader as well as another member of the group. Due to data problems however, the authors are unable to analyze differences in the impact of screening behavior of the group leader and other group members on repayment.
The paper focuses only the monitoring and social ties variables for studying the differential impact on repayment. The authors conclude that social ties of the group leader improve repayment performance of the group, whereas social ties among the rest of the group members has no impact on repayment performance. They also find that all monitoring measures, whether of the group leader or other group members, are insignificant determinants of repayment performance.
Our paper on the other hand, uses a larger and richer data set of borrowing groups from Jordan which enables us to investigate screening issues as well. Moreover, we use a dependent variable that measures the intensity of default instead of the usual indicator variable. This allows us to use a Negative Binomial model which strengthens our results, suggesting the need for such models in the group lending literature. Our results show that an increase in the joint liability of the group leader reduces late repayment while an increase in the joint liability of the remaining group members does not. We find evidence that screening activities of the group leader reduce late repayment while screening activities of the rest of the group members do not affect repayment. Monitoring variables have no effect, while social ties of both group leaders and other group members do have an impact on repayment performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide an account of the MFW in Jordan and the responsibilities of the group leader in this program. Section 3 describes how the survey was carried out, the data collection process and the resulting dataset we use in the empirical analysis. In section 4 we present the empirical model and estimation results. Section 5 contains a summary of our main findings and some concluding remarks. The MFW mandates that group members know each other, a requirement that is always satisfied since borrowers form a group on their own before approaching the bank.
The MFW and the Role of the Group Leader
The group is required to respect loan size caps for each loan cycle, which in this case is eight months. Moreover, group members cannot be business partners or from the same (nuclear) family; relatives however can be part of the same group. The MFW holds two basic meetings with the borrowing groups: one to complete an initial set of forms and discuss policies, and a second to define group members' roles and review the loan contract orally prior to releasing the loan.
In the disbursement meeting at the MFW branch, clients are reminded of contract policies. To discourage delinquency, a late penalty of JD3 per day is imposed. Delinquent cases are referred to court after 21 days. Since its inception, the MFW has been successful at maintaining repayment rates above 98% for its group loans.
In the second meeting a group leader is chosen by the group members themselves to function as an intermediary between the group members and the loan officers.
Additionally each group also selects a treasurer who has a nominal role, serving mainly as an assistant to the group leader. Being a group leader or treasurer is a voluntary activity and does not confer any financial privileges. The group leader supervises group members and updates the loan officer about developments relating to group members.
This can range from information about change or termination of projects, to change of residential or business address, or even an illness that may hinder a group member from making timely payments. Along with the treasurer, the group leader collects the monthly payment from group members. If a member refuses or fails to repay her installment, the leader can call a group meeting to discuss and update all group members about the situation. In such meetings the leader typically arranges to collect the remaining balance of the defaulting member. The group leader is also required to report such incidents to the loan officer.
On disbursement day, the loan officer gives the group leader and the treasurer one check equal to the total group loan. The group as a whole then goes to a designated bank to cash it. Only the leader and the treasurer are allowed to handle the check and the money, while the other members supervise. The leader with the treasurer's help then implements the loan contract among group members in the banker's presence. The loan is repaid in installments at the same bank into a designated account. vi An invoice about the transaction is delivered by the leader to the MFW on the day the group submits a payment installment.
Observe that a group leader's responsibilities gives her an advantage in obtaining information regarding the reputation, effort levels, indebtedness, wealth and other aspects of the rest of the group members. Since the leader has to function as the group's representative and update the loan officer of any repayment difficulties, this may also intensify her incentives to enforce repayment. Apart from this intermediary affect there may also be pecuniary pressures arising due to the size of the leader's liability. Data from a survey of borrowing groups from the MFW in Jordan allows us to shed light on the impact of the group leader on the group repayment performance relative to the impact of the rest of the group members.
The Data
We surveyed 160 randomly selected MFW borrowing groups in Jordan during a two month period in 2005. The survey covered two provinces in Jordan: Irbid in the north and Al-Rusaifa in the mid-northern region and was conducted at the MFW branch offices. vii In Irbid, we surveyed 84 groups while in Al-Rusaifa the survey covered 76
groups. Leaders of borrowing groups were interviewed as they walked into the branch offices for loan transaction related matters. Waiting at the MFW branch office for group leaders to show up ensured that there is no bias in our sample as leaders eventually do have to come to the bank for loan repayment on a monthly basis. Note that three out of 163 group leaders asked refused to provide answers to the survey questionnaire.
In the survey, we elicit information about socio-economic characteristics of the group leader and other group members. We also include questions on the process of screening, monitoring, and the existence of social ties within groups. Moreover, these questions distinguish between the characteristics and activities of the group leaders, and the others in the group, allowing us to investigate their differential impact on repayment performance.
Data on loan size, interest rate, group size, and the number of continuing, old, and new members of each group, and the loan application dates were obtained from the MFW's database. Also obtained from the MFW's data base is the number of installments paid and the number of installments due, the actual dates of repayment, the actual repayment amounts, as well as the scheduled repayment dates for each group.
Variable Description
We now provide a detailed description of the variables used in this study. Table 2 provides a short description as well as the summary statistics for each variable. In Table 2 and hereafter, the letter L precedes variables pertaining to group leaders while variables about the other group members have the letter G as a prefix.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is measured as the total number of days the group has been late in repaying up until the survey took place. We call this measure Delinquency
Intensity since it provides information about the extent of default. This measure of loan default is more informative about group behavior than the commonly used binary variable measuring occurrence of default. On average, groups have 3 days of late repayment with a minimum of zero days and a maximum of 41 days.
[Insert Table 2 ]
Independent Variables
The independent variables can be divided into five sub-sets.
(i) Control Variables
A number of personal characteristic variables were used. These include age, marital status, number of children, education level, and the religious intensity of the group leader versus the rest of the group members. The religious intensity variable was measured by asking whether members of the group pray five times daily. We find that there are two variables in which group leaders differ from all other group members.
Group leaders are clearly better educated and more religious. The means of these two variables for leaders are statistically different from those of other group members. It is worth keeping in mind that these differences in education and possibly moral character probably influence the group leader selection process.
The variable Payhist refers to the number of installments repaid or supposed to have been repaid since the loan was issued. It reflects the repayment behavior of each group in the current loan cycle. Since repayment behavior can also be affected by the possibility of future loans, the effect of repayment behavior can be non-linear. Therefore the log of repayment history (lnPayhist) is also considered in the empirical analysis. An additional control called Branch is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a group is from the Al-Rusaifa branch, and zero for groups belonging to the Irbid branch.
(ii) Joint Liability Variables
Our strategy for measuring the degree of joint liability uses information on group loan sizes as well as the share of the group leaders in these loans. viii Our measure of the group leader's joint liability payment, LJLiab is the percentage of the total group loan that the group leader has to repay if the rest of the group members default. The rest of the group's joint liability is measured as the percentage of the total group loan that any member of the rest of the group, on average, has to pay if all the others in the group, including the group leader, default. ix We call this variable GJLiab. We believe that
LJointLiab and GJointLiab are more direct and accurate measures of joint liability than other proxies like land or assets that have been used in the literature.
(iii) Screening Variables
We use two measures of screening. The first is a dummy variable, LScreen1, set The monitoring variables reflect the extent to which group members can acquire information about each other. We use two different measures of monitoring for both the leaders and other group members. LSamebus is a proxy for occupational homogeneity. It is the percentage of group members who share the leader's occupation. GSamebus is the percentage of other group members that have the same occupation. The hypothesis is that the more homogeneous the group is in term of its occupation, the easier it is to monitor members. Given that monitoring is a costly activity, the access of group members to phone services is used to capture such costs. The hypothesis is that the greater the access to phone services that group members have, the easier it is to monitor each other. Lphone is a dummy equal to 1 if the group leader has a land or cell phone, and Gphone is a dummy equal to 1 if at least two of the other group members have a land or cell phone.
(v) Social Ties Variables
The first proxy for social ties considers the social ties of the group leader with his relatives in a group. We consider the percentage of the remaining group members that are related to the group leader and the degree of social ties between the group leader and his relatives. The degree of social ties utilizes 2 yes/no questions asked to group leaders: (i)
whether group members can count on each other to take care of a child if they need to go away for a while, and (ii) whether a group member has had phone conversations with other group members in the past week. The number of yes responses to these questions comprises an index of social ties within the group as a whole. LSocialties is therefore the social ties of the group leader with his relatives in a group. A similar measure,
GSocialties considers the social ties among relatives for the rest of the group members.
xi The second measure of social ties considers whether group members have been in the same group since its inception. Linception is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the group leader was in the group since inception, and Ginception is a dummy variable equal to 1 if at least two members of the rest of the group were in the group since inception.
Empirical Model and Results
Our empirical analysis uses Negative Binomial models to estimate the effects of a number of independent variables on group repayment behavior as measured by the Delinquency Intensity variable. xii In particular, we adopt the Negative Binomial II (NB2) specification with quadratic variance function that has been found to be very useful in applied work (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998) . In this model the relationship between the mean parameter and the covariates is as follows:
. The second moment for the negative binomial model is given by:
Observe that the variance of y is proportional to its mean µ, and the proportionality factor α is also a function of the mean. This specification allows for over-dispersion since α>0 
[Insert Table 3]
The signs on the joint liability variables of the group leader, LJointliab and the rest of the group members, GJointliab are negative in both models. These negative signs support claim of Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1994) over Stiglitz (1990) , Ghatak A number of other specifications were also estimated where we additionally controlled for personal characteristics of the leader and other group members. Our main results reported in Table 3 remain robust in terms of statistical significance and sign of the coefficients to the inclusion of these variables, with the exception of LScreen2 that occasionally becomes insignificant without changing its sign. Some of the personal characteristics appear to be significant. The age of the leader had very small but positive and significant effect while the age of the other group members had a negative and significant effect on repayment performance. The variables on education, and marital status were not significant while the religious intensity of only the group members had a negative and slightly significant effect. The reported models in Table 3 were chosen using the Bayesian information criterion (1996) . Given our sample size our goal was to focus on the variables of theoretical interest without increasing the number of regressors.
Next we deviate from the basic regression shown in Table 3 by: (i), dropping the rest of the group related variables to estimate the group leader regression, and (ii) dropping the group leader related variables to estimate the rest of the group members'
regression. The results of these separate estimations are shown are shown in Table 4 .
[Insert Table 4]
In terms of signs and significance levels the results of the separate regressions are comparable to the model in Table 3 , except for Ginception and the rest of the group measures of screening Gscreen1 and Gscreen2. The screening measures Gscreen1 and Gscreen2 have the expected negative sign but remain statistically insignificant.
Ginception also becomes insignificant. All other results remain the same.
Discussion
Our empirical analysis provides evidence about the important role of the group leaders in improving repayment performance of the group as a whole. Our results show that an increase in the joint liability of the group leader reduces late repayment while an increase in the joint liability of the remaining group members does not. We also find evidence that screening activities of the group leader reduce late repayment while screening activities of the rest of the group members do not affect repayment. Monitoring variables have no effect while social ties of both group leaders and other group members have an effect on repayment performance.
How can we explain the different impacts of the group leader versus the rest of the group members on the repayment performance of the group based on these results?
Based on our results, it seems that education or religiousness of the group leader themselves do not affect repayment performance. Instead they play a key role in the choice of the group leader. In other words these are characteristics that one can associate with leaders, not necessarily the ones that help improve repayment. What affects repayment performance in fact seems to be the behavior of the leaders. We believe that the outcomes can be explained using the two effects mentioned in the introductory section.
The increased liability effect is quite simply what theory suggests. As the joint liability payment of the group leader increases it raises her marginal benefit of screening, and monitoring activities. If the group leader puts more effort into these activities, it is possible that other group members may reduce their effort and free ride on the group leader, making the joint liability effect of the other group members on repayment insignificant.
The intermediary effect works through two channels. First, by having more information the group leader can direct her effort better having a greater impact on the repayment performance. Second, the leader is also the group's spokesperson who has to face the MFW officials in case of a repayment delay or default. This responsibility of the group leader may put her under pressure to use her social ties and intensify her activities of screening and monitoring to compel other group members into make their payments on time.
Our findings have implications for theoretical work on group lending. We believe theoretical models that take non-identical agents into account will have differential efforts by agents arising in equilibrium. It is also important to study conditions under which the two effects mentioned above will have a stronger influence on repayment. This will allow for the better design of programs and thus our findings also have implications for policy. We believe that lenders may wish to treat leaders differently from other group members. This could mean rewarding leaders either financially or by providing them with some other privileges. In an environment where groups are sensitive to the joint liability parameter, the lender might wish to keep a close control of how the group's liability varies across members. On the other hand if the leaders seem to be responsive to social pressure then social recognition would perhaps be an excellent motivating factor. Wydick (1999) , Zeller (1998) . For a recent and insightful paper on the empirical aspects of this topic see Hermes and Lensink (2007) .
iii The social psychology literature documents that the need to justify one's action to others leads to greater cognitive effort (see for instance Tetlock (1983) , Tetlock and Kim (1987) , Lerner and Tetlock (1999) , and Vieider (2007)). iv All tables can be found at the end of the paper. v The official currency of Jordan is Jordanian Dinars (JD). At the time of data collection JD1 was equivalent to USD0.72. vi It is usually the leader who makes the trip to the bank for paying the monthly installment clearly suggesting that the treasurer plays a nominal role. vii The reasons for choosing these two provinces are due to their geographical proximity to Moh'd AlAzzam's place of residence. Since we had no financial support to conduct the survey and time was a constraint, it was necessary to make pragmatic choices. Given that these provinces are fairly representative we do not believe that the choice of provinces introduces any bias in the sample. viii The information on group loan sizes was obtained from the MFW data base while information on group leader loan size was obtained from the survey. ix The group leader joint liability payment is measured as (1 -(group leader loan size/total group loan size)).The rest of the group joint liability payment is measured as (1-(average loan size of a member of the rest of the group/total group loan size)). Thus the leader and a group member's liability are computed assuming that all the others in the group except the person in question defaults.
x Although a part of the information about the other members used in this study has been obtained from the leaders themselves, we do not think that this introduces a bias. Most group leaders seemed happy to talk about their experiences, appeared to be well-informed about other group members, were proud of their achievements, and felt that the program empowered them. The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 show that with the exception of two variables all the others have similar means. xi This amounts to assuming that the intensity of ties that other members of the group have with their relatives is the same as strength of ties between the leader and his relatives. Anecdotal evidence from talking to group leaders suggests that this may be a reasonably close approximation. However, to be on the safe side we report results with and without this variable. xii The Poisson model is not appropriate in this case due to over-dispersion in the data. The variable Delinquency Intensity ranges in value from zero to forty one. Approximately 85% of the sample takes values of 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4. The mean of the number of days of late repayment is 3.1 days with a variance of 40.26. The raw data are therefore over-dispersed and the inclusion of regressors does not eliminate overdispersion in the Poisson model indicating an inadequate fit. xiii In Ahlin and Townsend (2007) , the joint liability payment is measured for the group as a whole using the percentage of group members who don't own land as a measure for joint liability payment. The joint liability variable in Ahlin and Townsend was found to worsen repayment. The authors justify the use of this variable as a proxy for the joint liability payment by relating the size of the group's assets to potential liability. So if a larger proportion of the group own land then a member's liability will be lower as the lender can seize the defaulter's land. However, one may argue that the higher the percentage of landless members in a group, the lower the capacity of this group to repay. xiv This can be seen as a clear example of the intermediary effect where a leader who has been part of the group for a longer time period will have more information about the members.
